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Money, Interest Rates, Prices,
And Output
HE MONEY SUPPLY and commercial bank credit
have risen rapidly since January. In recent months in-
terest rates have also risen markedly. These develop-
ments might appear to be a paradox, but a close exami-
nation of economic relationships indicates that they can
be interpreted in awaywhich is entirely consistent with
economic theory. The developments in financial mar-
kets in the past two years have given rise to consider-
able question concerning the underlying forces affect-
ing interest rates. This note traces these events and re-
lates them to one frequently cited theory. Before dis-
cussing interest rate movements during the past two
years, the cnrrent economic situation is briefly pre-
sented.
Recent Developments
The money stock, defined as private demand de-
posits plus currency, rose at an estimated S per cent
annual rate from January to October, while money
defined to include time deposits at commercial banks
grew at a 12 per cent rate. Looking at the components
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separately, private demand deposits (checking ac-
counts) increased at a 9 per cent rate, currency held
by the public at a5per cent rate and time deposits at
a 17 per cent rate. In each case these rates were much
faster than the trendrates.
Underlying the growth of money, total reserves of
member banks increased at a 10 per cent annual rate,
and reserves available for private demand deposits
(total reserves minus required reserves on time, inter-
bank, and Government deposits) increased at a7per
cent rate. This increase in total reserves compares with
a 5 per cent average rate of increase from 1964 to 1966
and a S per cent trend rate from 1957 to 1964. Federal
Reserve credit, the main source of new reserves, rose
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Page 2at a 12 per cent rate during the January to October
period. The major component of Federal Reserve
credit is the System’s holdings of U. S. Government
securities.
Most business indicators which in the earlier months
of this year had indicated some softness turned up
during the second quarter and have since risen rapid-
ly. Retail sales increased at a 9.5 per cent annual rate
from late spring to early fall, after about a 6 per cent
increase during theprevious twelve months. The growth
trend in these sales from 1957 to 1966 was 5 per
cent per year. Despite a major automobile strike, in-
dustrial production has risen at a 2 per cent rate since
June, after declining at a 3.2 per cent rate from Octo-
ber last year to June. Total employment has risen at
about a3per cent rate since late spring, somewhat
faster than the 2 per centrate of growth from early fall
to late spring.
Gross National Product in current dollars increased
at a sharp S per cent annual rate from the second to
the third quarter this year, after growing at only a 3.4
per cent rate from the fourth quarter of 1966. Real
output rose at a 4.2 per cent rate from the second to
the third quarter after growing at only a modest 1 per
cent rate from the fourth quarter 1966 to second quar-
ter this year.
As indicated by the widening gap between the GNP
figures in current and constant dollars on the chart,
overall prices rose at a 3.5 per cent annual rate from
the second to third quarter, up from a 2.3 per cent
rate in the previous two quarters~. Both consumer
prices and industrial wholesale prices have been ris-
ing again since the May-June period, following a
period of little pressure on prices in the previous few
months.
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Long-term interest rates on both corporate and
Government securities have been rising since early
spring and are now well above the highs of a year
ago. Yields on short-term securities have risen since
mid-year, but are still below 1966 peaks. Since mid-
June, yields on intermediate-term securities have been
higher than on either short or long-term obligations.
This same relationship existed during the period of ris-
ing rates in the spring and summer of 1966, The im-
plication of this condition may be that the market has
been expecting rates on new issues of short-term secur-
ities to rise in the near-term, but subsequently to
return to a lower level.1
One Theory of Forces At ect~ngInterest
Rate Levet.r
In financial markets, interest rates are the prices at
which the quantity supplied and the quantity demand.
ed of particular financial assets are equated. The way
in which the money stock is related to the demand
for any supply of some financial assets is somewhat
complex. On the one hand, an increase in the money
supply and hank credit adds directly to the supply of
t
For a discussion of the term-structure of interest rates see
“Changing Structure of interest Bates” in the June 1967 issue
of this Review.
an attempt to estimate empirically the forces affecting
iaterest rates see W. E. Gibson and CC. Kaufman, “The Rel-
ative Impact of Money and Income on Interest Rates: An
Empirical Investigation,” Staff Economic Study Nnmber 26;
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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lendable funds. An increase in money results in the
bidding up of the prices of financial assets, causing
interest rates to be lower than they otherwise would
be.
On the other hand, some argue that a rise in the
money supply and bank credit also has expansionary
effects on the total demand for goods and services. If
dollar balances and credit are increased rapidly, given
existing assets, incomes, prices, and interest rates,
people will attempt to exchange the “excess money”
for goods, services, or other financial assets, Any in-
crease in demand for goods and services will result
initially in the running down of inventories and, sub-
sequently, a rise in production and an increase in
credit demands. If the increased demands for credit
which result from a large monetary expansion are
greater than the supply of credit created, net upward
pressure on interest rates will result after some lag.
If the rates of increase in money supply, credit,
and total demand are faster than the rates at which
output can be increased, prices will rise. Rising prices
also cause increased demands for credit, since more
funds are needed to finance a given volume of goods.
With expectations of inflation, borrowers are willing
to pay higher rates since they expect to repay with
cheaper dollars, and lenders charge higher rates in
order to net the same real return in the process of al-
locating limited funds.
According to this view, marked and sustained
changes in monetary growth have opposite short and
long-run effects on interest rates. Rapid increases
of the money supply will cause interest rates to be
lower over an immediate short period than they other-
wise would be. However, the effects of sustained
changes in rates of monetary growth over several
months or longer work indirectly in the oppositedirec-
tion. Prolonged increases in the money supply, at rates
greater than the growth in the demand for money to
hold, cause increases in the demand for goods, serv-
ices, credit, and ultimately in prices. As a result, mar-
ket rates of interest will be adjusted upward as a re-
sponse to more vigorous credit demands and to com-
pensate for the rise in prices and consequent decrease
in the purchasingpower of money.
In summary, this theory suggests that the shorter
and longer-mn effects may, at times, work against
each other. At other times, as may have been observed
during different periods of the past year and a half,
these forces can both be pushing interest rates in the
same direction.
Interest Rate Movements In the Last
Two Years
The strength of monetary forces and the responsive-
ness of spending, prices, and interest rates to these
forces has been given a rigorous test over the past
two years. The rapid monetary growth of 1965 and
early 1966 was suddenly halted in the spring of 1966
only to be fully resumed since the beginning of the
current year. Compared with a 3.2 per cent trend rate
of growth from 1961 to 1965, money rose 6 per cent
from the spring of 1965 to the spring of 1966, remained
about unchanged the remainder of that year, and sub-
sequently has risen at an S per cent rate. Interest rates,
output, and prices responded to both of these sharpre-
versals of monetary growth in a manner consistent with
the theory outlined above.
The advanced rate of monetary growth during
1964 and early 1965 contributed to increases in output
and employment, but increases in total demands for
goods, services, and credit did not proceed at rates
greater than the growth in production. Consequently,
prices and interest rates remained relatively stable.
Toward the end of 1965 and in early 1966, the expan-
sion in economic activity fostered an increase in the
demands for credit, producing increasing upward pres-
sure on interest rates. This force on rates was mod-
erated to some extent in the short-term by rapid in-
creases in the money supply and bank credit. How-
ever, it is argued that the rapid growth in money
caused still further stimulation of spending and credit
demands, resulting finally in additional upward pres-
sure on interest rates.
When the growth in the money supply was halted
in the spring of 1966, this argument continuesn the
short-run impact was reversed, reinforcing the upward
Page 4pressure on interest rates. Atthe same time, the longer-
run impact of previous money injections continued to
be upward for several months. The rapid monetary
growth of 1965 and early 1966 provided an expan-
sionary force on spending and output, creating up-
ward pressure on prices into the fall of the year. Thus,
interest rates were influenced by both the continuing
impact of the previous period of rapid monetary ex-
pansion and the immediate effect of the reduced rate
of growth in money. Sharply rising interest rates
throughout the summer and into the early fall of 1966
w,rere the result.
By the fall of 1966, when the public protests against
rising prices and interest rates were loudest, a major
source of the inflationary pressure (rapid monetary
expansion) had long since disappeared, and economic
forces were well advanced in the reversal process.
Some economic analysts were already pointing out
that the lack of monetary growth since spring would
have delayed contractionary effects which would
soon be felt.8 The thrust of economic expansion began
to weaken in late 1966 despite the most stimulative
Federal budget in twenty years. With demand for
goods slowing, credit demands eased, causing a def-
inite downward trend in interest ratesin late 1966 and
early 1967.
Shortly after the turn of the year came the second
sharp reversal in monetary growth in less than a year.
For the first few months, as in the previous summer,
short and long-run effects worked in the same direc-
tion. The rapid growth in the money stock and avail-
able credit produced downward pressure on interest
rates, supplementing the trend caused by easing credit
demands andreduced pressure on prices.
Following the rapid growth of money early in the
year, economic activity gained momentum in the late
spring. At this time, most interest rates reached lows
for the cycle discussed and began rising. Since then
the short-run effect of monetary growth on interest
rates has still been downward as the money supply
and bank credit continue to grow at rapid rates. How-
ever, the upward longer-run effects, via stimulation of
spending and credit demands, have again been domi-
nant, as they had been in late 1965 and early 1966. On
balance, this is causing upward pressure on interest
rates once again.
Expectations of renewed price inflation have in-
3
”Monthly Economic Letter”, First National City Bank of New
York, September, 1966. And, Karl Brunner, “U.S. Economy
in Cross-Currents Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A
Reconsideration of the New Economics”, Bulletin of Business
Research, (Ohio State University, February, 1967). (Publica-
tion ofa previously delivered speech)
creased as upward price trends accelerated during the
summer. Adherents to this theory might conclude
that the rapid monetary growth through October of
this year may have been sufficient to place strong up-
ward pressure on prices and interest rates for some
time into thefuture. So long as the rate of monetaryex-
pansion continues to be relatively high, the theory in-
dicates that there will continue to be strong forces
leading to higher prices and interest rates. However,
if the rate of monetary growth is sharply curtailed
with the intention of eventually stopping inflation and
achieving lower rates, the short-run effects of the re-
duced volume of funds would result in even higher
interests rates over the near future. This analysis in-
dicates that the economy, as in the spring of 1966,
must be willing to bear the temporary cost of higher
interest rates in the near term if goals of sustainable
growth in total demand, relative price stability, and
a lower level of interest rates are subsequently to be
achieved.
“The Differential Impact” of
Stabilization Palicy
An interest rate is a price, and as is true of all prices,
interest rates serve a rationing function.4 Interest rates
are the price that allocates available funds between
businesses and households. At the same time, they
serve to divide the funds among different businesses
and among different households. Expected profitability
of alternative uses of funds is one of the factors affect-
ing businesses’ decisions concerning the amount of
funds they demand at various levels of interest rates.
Similarly, households’ decisions concerning credit pur-
chases and saving are affected by their income con-
straint and willingness to delay some consumption
desires.
In a period of economic expansion, it is reasonable
to expect that anticipated profits from investment op-
portunities in plant and equipment, inventories, land,
and housing will improve, but each by different a-
mounts, and that financial assets such as bonds will be
sold in order to take advantage of these favorable op-
portunities. With a given supply of funds, the price of
bonds will fall (yields will rise) to the point where the
marginal investor is indifferent between the return on
bonds and the anticipated return from other invest-
ment opportunities.
4
We usually talk about interest rates with reference to mar-
ketable securities, but it is Important to remember that the
interest rate applies to all goods. The rate of interest reflects
the price or cost of the convenience of earlier availability,
natural preference for more certain rather than less certain
consumption rights, and the economy’s ability to use resources
to increase total output.
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are “priced out of the market”. This could be called a
“differential impact”, a term which applies equally
well to any pricing or allocation mechanism. Any
change in price or method of allocation may be un-
desirable to some individuals or sectors of the econo-
my. A tax increase, on personal or corporate incomes,
on sales or on property, also will be painful to those
who must pay more. Less disposable income con-
strains the volume of purchase, but prices will change
in response.
If there are not monetary actions constraining the
volume of available funds, or fiscal actions constraining
disposable incomes or government expenditures, then
prices and interest rates will rise as the market mecha-
nism allocates scarce resources. Inflation causes reallo-
cation of both wealth and command over real out-
put. This is harmful to certain groups of the economy.
Finally, allocation by any non-market means, such
as price controls and rationing, is undesirable to some.
In a free market economy, interest rates act to al-
locate money balances—which represent command over
real output—among individuals, firms, and the govern-
ment sector. A rising interest rate, and possibly a de-
creasing supply of funds at each level of interest rates,
at a time that restraint is initiated, forces certain in-
dividuals and firms to reduce their command over real
output. This is very disturbing to those adversely ef-
fected. However, these temporary ill effects should be
weighed against the real benefits for the whole econo-
my from reducing inflationary pressures in the longer-
run. In addition, as this theory suggests, the adverse al-
location of funds from certain groups will only be
temporary since rates are expected to decrease once
inflation is controlled.5
5For other recent discussions of the present financial situation
which employ similar theoretical analysis, see A. James Meigs,
“A Monetary View,” prepared for a session of the National As-
sociation of Business Economists, Detroit, Michigan, September
29, 1967. Also, Ralph F. Leach, “Marking Treasury Issues
With Conversion”, The Weekly Bond Buyer, October 23,
1967, pp. 9-11, and Boy L. Rierson, “Fed’s Dilemma
The Weekly Bond Buyer, October 23, 1967, pp. 12-14. Also
see “Trends and Recent Relationships in Yields on U.S. Govern-
ment Securities”, in the October 1967 issue of Economic Re-
view, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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